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Abstract—In ownership-based access control frameworks with
the possibility of delegating permissions and administrative
rights, chains of delegated accesses will form. There are different
ways to treat these delegation chains when revoking rights,
which give rise to different revocation schemes. One possibility
studied in the literature is to revoke rights by issuing negative
authorizations, meant to ensure that the revocation is resilient to
a later reissuing of the rights, and to resolve conflicts between
principals by giving precedence to predecessors, i.e. principals
that come earlier in the delegation chain. However, the effects of
negative authorizations have been defined differently by different
authors. Having identified three definitions of this effect from
the literature, the first contribution of this paper is to point
out that two of these three definitions pose a security threat.
However, avoiding this security threat comes at a price: We
prove that with the safe definition of the effect of negative
authorizations, deciding whether a principal does have access
to a resource is an NP-complete decision problem. We discuss
two limitations that can be imposed on an access-control system
in order to reduce the complexity of the problem back to a
polynomial complexity: Limiting the length of delegation chains
to an integer m reduces the runtime complexity of determining
access to O(nm), and requiring that principals form a hierarchy
that graph-theoretically forms a rooted tree makes this decision
problem solvable in quadratic runtime. Finally we discuss an
approach that can mitigate the complexity problem in practice
without fully getting rid of NP-completeness.
Index Terms—access control, delegation, revocation, resilience,
negative authorization, denial, predecessor takes precedence,
complexity
I. INTRODUCTION
In ownership-based frameworks for access control, it is
common to allow principals (users or processes) to grant both
permissions and administrative rights to other principals in the
system. Often it is desirable to grant a principal the right to
further grant permissions and administrative rights to other
principals. This may lead to delegation chains starting at a
source of authority (the owner of a resource) and passing on
certain permissions to other principals in the chain [12], [14],
[5], [15].
Furthermore, such frameworks commonly allow a principal
to revoke a permission that she granted to another principal
[10], [16], [5], [2]. Depending on the reasons for the revo-
cation, different ways to treat the chain of principals whose
permissions depended on the second principal’s delegation
rights can be desirable [10], [6]. For example, if one is
revoking a permission given to an employee because he is
moving to another position in the company, it makes sense
to keep in place the permissions of principals who received
their permissions from this employee; but if one is revoking
a permission from a user who has abused his rights and is
hence distrusted by the user who granted the permission,
it makes sense to delete the permissions of principals who
received their permission from this user. Any algorithm that
determines which permissions to keep intact and which per-
missions to delete when revoking a permission is called a
revocation scheme. Revocation schemes are usually defined
in a graph-theoretical way on the graph that represents which
authorizations between the principals are intact.
Hagstro¨m et al. [10] have presented a framework for
classifying possible revocation schemes along three different
dimensions: the extent of the revocation to other grantees
(propagation), the effect on other grants to the same grantee
(dominance), and the permanence of the negation of rights (re-
silience). This classification was based on revocation schemes
that had been implemented in database management systems
[9], [7], [4], [3].
The resilience dimension in Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework
distinguishes revocation by removal (deletion) of positive
authorizations from revocation by issuing a negative autho-
rization which just inactivates positive authorizations. When
defining which positive authorizations get inactivated by neg-
ative authorizations, Hagstro¨m et al. have not taken care to
ensure that the outcome is as desired when multiple nega-
tive authorizations interact: A system implementing negative
revocations as defined by Hagstro¨m et al. would in certain
scenarios grant access to an access-requesting principal even
though all delegation chains linking the owner of the resource
to the access-requesting principal contain a principal that
has issued a negative authorization to the access-requesting
principal. As discussed in subsection III-D, we consider this
a security threat. The first definition of negative revocation
schemes that avoids this threat was provided by Cramer et al.
[6].
This paper has three main contributions (the third of which
consists of three parts):
• In section III, we compare different definitions of the
effect of negative authorizations from the literature, show
that the definitions in [10] and [1] pose a security threat,
while the definition in [6] avoids this threat.
• However, there is a computational price to pay: In section
IV, we prove that deciding whether a principal does have
access to a resource in a system allowing for negative
authorizations that behave as defined in [6] is an NP-
complete decision problem, i.e. it is both in NP and NP-
hard.
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solving or handling this complexity problem:
– In section V, the complexity of the problem is
reduced to polynomial complexity by limiting the
length of delegation chains.
– In section VI, the complexity of the problem is
reduced to quadratic by requiring that principals form
a hierarchy that graph-theoretically forms a rooted
tree.
– In section VII, we present a method that can mitigate
the complexity problem in practice without fully
getting rid of NP-completeness.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
Hagstro¨m et al. [10] have introduced three dimensions
according to which revocation schemes can be classified.
These are called propagation, dominance and resilience:
Propagation. The decision of a principal i to revoke an
authorization previously granted to a principal j may either be
intended to affect only the direct recipient j or to propagate
and affect all the other users in turn authorized by j. In the
first case, we say that the revocation is local, in the second
case that it is global.
Dominance. This dimension deals with the case when a
principal losing a permission in a revocation still has permis-
sions from other grantors. If these other grantors’ revocation
rights are dependent on the revoker, the revoker can dominate
over these grantors and revoke the permissions from them.
This is called a strong revocation. The revoker can also choose
to make a weak revocation, where permissions from other
grantors to a principal losing a permission are kept.
Resilience. This dimension distinguishes revocation by re-
moval (deletion) of positive authorizations from revocation by
issuing a negative authorization which just inactivates positive
authorizations. In the first case another principal may grant
a similar authorization to the one that had been revoked, so
the effect of the revocation does not persist in time. In the
second case a negative authorization will overrule any (new)
positive permission given to the same principal, so its effect
will remain until the negative permission is revoked. We call a
revocation of the first kind a delete or non-resilient revocation,
and a revocation of the second kind a negative or resilient
revocation.
Since there are two possible choices along each dimension,
Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework allows for eight different revoca-
tion schemes.
Hagstro¨m et al. defined their eight revocation schemes semi-
formally. As is explained in detail in section 3.1 of [6], these
definitions contradict some of the properties that Hagstro¨m
et al. claim the revocation schemes to have. Aucher et al.
[1] formalized Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework in a dynamic
propositional logic, removing some of these problems in
Hagstro¨m et al.’s definitions.
As explained in subsection III-D below, both Hagstro¨m et
al.’s and Aucher et al.’s definition of the effect of revocations
via negative authorizations pose a serious security threat.
Cramer et al. [6] have proposed and formalized a refined
revocation framework that builds on Hagstro¨m et al.’s frame-
work and avoids this security threat. Among other differences,
Cramer et al.’s definitions of the revocation schemes differ
from Hagstro¨m et al.’s and Aucher et al.’s definitions in how
interacting revocations are handled. This is discussed in detail
in the next section.
A. Conflict resolution policies
Delegation frameworks that allow issuing negative autho-
rization can bring about a state in which a conflict may
arise. If a principal is granted both a positive and a negative
authorization for the same object, then we say that these two
authorizations conflict each other. A system’s conflict resolu-
tion policy determines how to resolve such a conflict. Here is
a list of possible conflict resolution policies as described by
Ruan and Varadharajan [13]:
Negative-takes-precedence: If there is a conflict occurring
on the authorization for some object, the negative authoriza-
tions will take precedence over the positive one.
Positive-takes-precedence: Positive authorizations from i
to j take precedence over negative authorizations from k to j
for all k 6= i. This means that a negative authorization from i
to j directly inactivates only positive authorizations from i to
j, and leaves other permission to j active.
Strong-and-Weak: Authorizations are categorized in two
types, strong and weak. The strong authorizations always
take precedence over the weak ones. Conflicts among strong
authorizations are not allowed. In conflicts between weak
authorizations negative ones take precedence. Note that the
intended meaning of strong and weak in this policy differs
from their meaning in Hagstro¨m et al.’s dominance dimension.
Time-takes-precedence: New authorizations take prece-
dence over previously existing ones. Note that this policy will
make negative authorizations non-resilient.
Predecessor-takes-precedence: If the principal i delegates
(possibly transitively) some right to principal j, then autho-
rizations issued by i to some other principal k concerning that
right will take precedence over authorizations issued by j to
k. In other words, the priority of subjects decreases as the
privilege is delegated forward.
Note that according to Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition of a
strong revocation mentioned above, the effect of a strong
revocation is supposed to be the same as the effect that issuing
a negative authorization in the context of a predecessor-takes-
precedence conflict resolution policy. However, Hagstro¨m et
al. do not assume the conflict resolution policy of the system to
be prdecessor-takes-precedence. Instead, they consider the ef-
fect of the revocation schemes they defined in both a positive-
takes-precedence and a negative-takes-precedence conflict res-
olution policy. They achieve the effect that a single negative
authorization has in a predecessor-takes-precedence conflict
resolution policy by potentially producing multiple negative
authorizations in the course of a single strong revocation.
When Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition of a strong revocation is
applied in the context of a negative-takes-precedence policy,
the effect of a strong revocation is not as described in
Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition of a strong revocation mentioned
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to j dominates all positive authorizations granted to j, not just
the ones granted by a principal dependent on i.
Cramer et al. [6] have incorporated the choice of how to
resolve conflicts into the dominance dimension by extending
Hagstro¨m et al.’s dominance dimension into a dimension
involving three instead of just two choices:
• Weak revocations. These have the same intended be-
haviour as Hagstro¨m et al.’s weak revocations in a
positive-takes-precedence policy: The principal perform-
ing the revocation only dominates over direct autho-
rizations granted by herself, authorizations from other
grantors are kept intact.
• Predecessor-takes-precedence (p-t-p) revocations.
These have the same intended behaviour as Hagstro¨m’s
et al.’s strong revocations in a positive-takes-precedence
policy: The principal performing the revocation
dominates over other grantors’ authorizations that are
dependent on her.
• Strong revocations. These have the same intended be-
haviour as any of Hagstro¨m’s et al.’s revocations in a
negative-takes-precedence policy: The principal perform-
ing the revocation dominates over all other grantors’
authorizations.
In this paper we focus on revocations that are on the
domoinance dimension like Hagstro¨m et al.’s strong revoca-
tions and like Cramer et al.’s predecessor-takes-precedence
revocations.
B. Revocations and denials
A revocation of a principal’s rights removes rights that the
principal already has. A denial of rights on the other hand
can be issued even when the principal does not yet have the
concerning rights, and has the effect that other principals will
no longer be able to effectively grant rights to the affected
principal.
Negative authorizations can function as a form of denial.
When, for example, j does not yet have the rights in question
and i issues a negative authorization for those rights to j, this
negative authorization functions like a denial rather than like
a revocation.
The work in this paper applies to negative authorizations
independently of whether they are used to revoke existing
rights or deny rights. We will for the rest of this paper only
use the term “revocation” and not “denial”, in order to be
consistent with the terminology used in the papers that we
extensively refer to in this paper.
III. REVOCATION VIA NEGATIVE AUTHORIZATION
In this section we introduce the notion of a negative
authorization and of revocation via negative authorization.
After explaining the motivation behind negative authorizations,
we define a graph-theoretic framework in subsection III-A
that allows us to talk formally about the effects of negative
authorizations. In subsections III-B and III-C we present two
accounts from the literature of defining the effects of negative
authorizations. In subsection III-D we present a serious secu-
rity threat that both of these accounts face. In subsection III-E
we explain how this problem has been solved by Cramer et
al. [6], and briefly explain why their approach is immune to
this kind of security threats.
The idea behind a negative authorization is that it does not
only take away a certain permission or administrative right
from a user, but also blocks the user from getting this access
from another user, at least from a user dependent on the issuer
of the negative authorization. For example, if Alice distrusts
Bob and wants to do all that she can to ensure that Bob
will not get access to a certain file, she can issue a negative
authorization towards Bob, thus ensuring that even if someone
whom she granted the right to further grant access rights to
that file does grant Bob access right, Bob will still be blocked
from accessing the file.
This paper is only about delegation revocation via negative
authorizations, so we will not say anything about delegation
revocation by deletion of authorizations. A revocation scheme
based on issuing a negative revocation is called a negative
revocation scheme. In Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework, there are
four different negative revocation schemes, because there are
four possible choices to be made along the dominance and
propagation dimensions of their framework (see section II).
The behaviour of weak negative authorizations is clear and
does not pose any of the problems discussed below. So in
our discussion, we will focus on revocation schemes that are
called strong by Hagstro¨m et al. [10] and Aucher et al. [1]
and called predecessor-takes-precedence (p-t-p) by Cramer et
al. [6]. The problems discussed below apply equally to global
and local revocation schemes; for the sake of simplicity, we
will concentrate on global revocation schemes in this paper.
So for the rest of the paper, the only revocation scheme we
consider is what Hagstro¨m et al. [10] and Aucher et al. [1]
call a Strong Global Negative revocation, and what Cramer et
al. [6] call a P-t-p Global Resilient revocation.
A. Graph-theoretic framework
Even though this revocation scheme called Strong Global
Negative in [10] and [1] and P-t-p Global Resilient in [6] is
intended to be basically the same revocation scheme and does
behave identically in simple scenarios, the formal definitions
of this revocation scheme are somewhat different across these
papers, resulting in a different behaviour especially when
multiple revocations interact. In order to compare these dif-
ferent definitions, we describe the possible effects of negative
authorizations in graph-theoretic terms. To this end, let us first
define the notion of a delegation-revocation graph:
Definition 1: A delegation-revocation graph is a graph G =
(V,SOA, E+, E−) consisting of a set V of vertices, also called
principals, a distinguished vertex SOA ∈ V called the source
of authority, a set E+ ⊆ V 2 of positive edges, also called
positive authorizations, and a set E− ⊆ V 2 of negative edges,
also called negative authorizations.
Here an example of a simple delegation-revocation graph:
Example 1: A delegation-revocation graph for a resource
owned by user A
4Unbroken straight edges denote positive authorizations.
Dotted bent edges denote negative authorizations.
A B
C
D
E
The delegation-revocation graph keeps track of which pos-
itive and negative authorization concerning a certain resource
have been issued between the principals in the system. For
example, the delegation-revocation graph 1 expresses that
B has issued both a positive and a negative authorization
towards D, but only a positive authorization towards C. The
source of authority is the owner of the resource in question:
All permissions emanate from the source of authority, i.e. a
principal can have a permission only if there is a delegation
chain from the source of authority to that user.
Since in this paper we are only considering revocation
schemes for which the temporal order of the issuing of the
authorizations is irrelevant, the authorization in a delegation-
revocation graph do not have timestamps.
Hagstro¨m et al. [10], Aucher et al. [1] and Cramer et
al. [6] all distinguish between positive authorizations that
only grant access and positive authorizations that additionally
grant delegation rights. In a delegation chain starting at the
source of authority, all but the last positive authorization
along the chain have to grant delegation rights. The issues
discussed in this paper arise from the granting of delegation
rights and are independent of whether the system allows users
to grant access rights without granting delegation rights. In
order to keep the exposition simple, we consider all positive
authorizations to grant delegation rights. This is why we have
only one kind of positive authorizations in our definition of
a delegation-revocation graph. The results presented in this
paper can easily be extended to systems that do have positive
authorizations that only grant access rights additionally to the
positive authorizations that also grant delegation rights.
Given that we have only one kind of positive authorizations,
the definition of a delegation chain is very simple:
Definition 2: In a delegation-revocation graph, a delegation
chain is a chain of positive authorizations starting at the source
of authority.
B. Hagstro¨m et al.’s Strong Global Negative revocation
Hagstro¨m et al. [10] define the effect of Strong Global
Negative revocations using the notion of a principal being
independent of another principal i, i.e. possessing delegation
rights in a way that is not dependent on i:
Definition 3: A principal k is independent of a principal i
iff there is a delegation chain ending in k that does not pass
through i.
Note in particular that a principal k is never independent of
k.
Hagstro¨m et al. [10] use this notion of independence to
define the effect of a Strong Global Negative revocation by
defining which positive authorizations are inactivated by a
negative authorization. There are two ways that a positive
authorization can be inactivated in their definition:
1) A negative authorization from i to j inactivates a positive
authorization from k to j if k is not independent of i.
2) Furthermore a positive authorization issued by a prin-
cipal k is inactivated if there is no active positive
authorization granting k delegation rights.
Case 1 takes care that the principal targeted by the Strong
Global Negative revocation loses her delegation rights if her
rights are not supported in a way independent of the principal
performing the revocation. Case 2 takes care of propagating
forward the effect of the revocation (given that it is a global
rather than a local revocation).
For example, in the delegation-revocation graph in Example
1, the negative authorization from B to D inactivates (based
on case 1) the positive authorization from B to D, because B
is not independent of B. Furthermore it inactivates (also based
on case 1) the positive authorization from C to D, because C
is not independent of B: The only delegation chain ending in
C goes through B. Once the positive authorizations from B to
D and from C to D are inactivated, the authorization from D
to E is also inactivated (based on case 2), as there is no active
positive authorization left that grants D delegation rights.
C. Aucher et al.’s Strong Global Negative revocation
Definition 3 is problematic, because it does not correctly
formalize the intended meaning of independent: Suppose there
is precisely one delegation chain ending in k and not passing
through i, but this delegation chain contains inactive autho-
rizations. In that case, this delegation chain does not in any
way support the rights of k. But according to definition 3, this
delegation chain would ensure that k is independent of i. The
problem is, of course, that definition 3 does not specify that
the delegation chain should be active, i.e. not contain inactive
authorizations.
In their formalization of Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework in
a dynamic propositional logic, Aucher et al. [1] corrected
this problem of Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition. However, instead
of defining the effect a negative authorization by defining
which positive authorizations it inactivates, they add auxiliary
negative authorizations to get the same result concerning
which users lose their access and delegation rights:
They define a Strong Global Negative revocation from i to
j to consist of issuing a negative authorization from i to j and
additionally adding auxiliary negative authorizations from k to
j for for every k that is not independent of i. They define k to
be independent of i iff there is a rooted delegation chain from
the SOA to i that does not contain i. A rooted delegation
chain is defined to be a delegation chain such that for any
two consecutive principals p, q along this delegation chain,
there is no negative authorization from p to q. A principal i
is defined to have access and delegation rights iff there is a
rooted delegation chain from the SOA to i.
The fact that the definition of independence refers only to
rooted delegation chains rather than to any delegation chains
removes the problem with Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition of
independence.
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B to D in the delegation-revocation graph 1 would in the
case of a Strong Global Negative revocation entail adding an
auxiliary negative authorization from C to D (because C is not
independent of B). Hence none of the two delegation chains
from A to D are rooted delegation chains, so D does no longer
have delegation rights, as expected. Similarly, none of the two
delegation chains from A to E are rooted delegation chains,
so also E does no longer have delegation rights.
D. A security threat
Even though Aucher et al. removed one problem in
Hagstro¨m et al.’s definition of the effect of Strong Global
Negative revocations, there remains another problem that is
present in both Aucher et al.’s and Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework
and that poses a security threat. This subsection describes this
security threat.
Consider the following delegation-revocation graph:
Example 2:
A
B
C
D E
The only two delegation chains from the SOA to E are
ABDE and ACDE. Both of these delegation chains contain a
principal that has issued a negative authorization towards E. By
issuing a negative authorization to E, B and C have expressed
distrust in E and intended to avoid that E gets access and
delegation rights through a user dependent on them. Hence E
should not have access and delegation rights in this scenario.
But according to the effect of negative authorizations as
defined by Hagstro¨m et al. [10] and Aucher et al. [1], E would
actually have access and delegation rights in this situation:
D is independent of B, because there is a delegation chain
ACD not going through B; and D is independent of C,
because there is a delegation chain ABD not going through
C. So neither the negative authorization from B to E nor the
negative authorization from C to E can inactivate the positive
authorization from D to E (in Hagstro¨m et al.’s account) or
lead to the addition of an auxiliary negative authorization from
D to E (in Aucher et al.’s account).
The problem is that in their definitions of the effect of a
negative authorization, both Hagstro¨m et al. and Aucher et
al. only accounted for the desired effect of a single negative
authorization, without taking into account what the desired
outcome should be when multiple negative authorizations
interact. In example 2, the two negative authorizations work
together to discredit user E; neither of the two negative
authorizations by itself should have any negative effect on E.
This problem poses a security threat because it allows prin-
cipals to have access and delegation rights that they should not
have. For instance, in example 2, Hagstro¨m et al.’s and Aucher
et al.’s frameworks would grant E access and delegation rights
even though E should not be granted these rights.
E. Solving the problem
One way to explain the problem is to point out that both
Hagstro¨m et al. and Aucher et al. have limited their notion of
independence to independence from a single user. But one can
also define the notion of a user being independent from a set
of users:
Definition 4: A principal i is defined to be independent of
a set S of principals iff there is an active delegation chain
(i.e. a delegation chain all of whose positive authorizations are
active) from the SOA to i that does not include any principal
in S.
Now one can replace Hagstro¨m et al.’s first way of inac-
tivating positive authorizations by the following definition of
inactivation: When there is a set S of principals such that from
every principal i ∈ S there is a negative authorization towards
j, and k is not independent of S, then a positive authorization
from k to j gets inactivated.
This desired effect of multiple interacting negative autho-
rizations can also be phrased in more simple terms, without
reference to the notions of independence and inactivation:
When all delegation chains linking the source of authority to
j contain a principal that has issued a negative authorization
to j, then j should not have access or delegation rights.
This way of defining the effect of multiple interacting
negative authorizations was introduced by Cramer et al. [6].
Formally, the effect can be defined by postulating that a
principal i should have access and delegation rights iff there
is a good delegation chain from the SOA to i, where a good
delegation chain is defined as follows:
Definition 5: Let G = (V,SOA, E+, E−) be a delegation-
revocation graph. A good delegation chain in G is a sequence
of vertices v0, . . . , vn such that v0 = SOA, (vi, vi+1) ∈ E+
for 0 ≤ i < n, and (vi, vj) /∈ E− for any 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
In other words, a good delegation chain is a delegation
chain with the property that no principal in the chain has
issued a negative authorization towards a principal later in
the delegation chain.
In order to explicitly distinguish Cramer et al.’s definition
of when a principal has access right from Hagstro¨m et al.’s
and Aucher et al.’s definitions, we will say that a principal has
safe access right if she has access right according to Cramer
et al.’ definition:
Definition 6: Let G = (V,SOA, E+, E−) be a delegation-
revocation graph, and let p ∈ V be a principal. We say that p
has safe access right iff there is a good delegation chain in G
that ends in p.
In Example 2, the delegation chain ABDE is not a good
delegation chain, because there is a negative authorization
from B to E, and B occurs in ABDE before E. Similarly,
ACDE is not a good delegation chain because of the negative
authorization from C to E. So there is no good delegation
chain from the SOA to E, i.e. E does not have safe access
right.
So Cramer et al. [6] have removed the security threat that
we have identified in subsection III-D. But can we be sure
that no similar security threat is still faced by Cramer et al.’s
definition? In order to clear up such doubts, Cramer et al. [6]
have developed a formal framework based on the notions of
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and revoking. This formal framework allowed them to for-
mally define the desired behaviour of interacting revocations.
This desired behaviour includes avoiding security threats like
the one identified in subsection III-D, but generalizes the
eschewal of such threats to arbitrary complex scenarios. They
established that the above definition of the effect of negative
authorizations has this desired behaviour, while the definitions
by Hagstro¨m et al. and Aucher et al. do not have this desired
behaviour.
The downside of Cramer et al.’s definition of the effect of
negative authorizations is that it makes the decisions problem
of deciding whether a principal has access or delegation right
NP-complete, as we will see in the following section. In the
case of Hagstro¨m et al.’s and Aucher et al.’s definition, on the
other hand, there is an algorithm with runtime quadratic in
the number of principals that decides whether a principal has
access or delegation rights.
IV. NP-COMPLETENESS
In the previous section we saw that the revocation frame-
works by Hagstro¨m et al. [10] and Aucher et al. [1] have
posed a security threat, and that this problem has been solved
by Cramer et al. [6] by giving a new definition of the effect of
negative authorizations. In this section we show that Cramer
et al.’s solution comes at a price: Whereas in Hagstro¨m et
al.’s and Aucher et al.’s framework it could be determined in
quadratic runtime whether a principal has access or delegation
right, in Cramer et al.’s framework the decisions problem of
deciding whether a principal p has safe access right is NP-
complete.
For this we need to show that this decision problem is both
in NP and NP-hard. It can be easily seen to be in NP, because
a good delegation chain from the SOA to p is a witness for
this decision problem: p has safe access right iff there is a
good delegation chain from the SOA to p, and determining
whether a given sequence of principals is a good delegation
chain can clearly be checked in polynomial time (namely in
quadratic time).
In order to prove that this decision problem is NP-hard, we
reduce 3-SAT [11] to this decision problem. Let a1, . . . , an
be propositional variables, and let C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm be a 3-SAT
problem in a1, . . . , an, i.e. each Ci is a clause of the form
li1∨li2∨li3, where each lij is a literal of the form ak or ¬ak. We
need to construct a delegation-revocation graph such that for
some specific principal p in this graph, p has safe access right
iff C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm is satisfiable. We describe the construction
of this delegation-revocation graph for the general case, and
illustrate it in figure 3 with the delegation-revocation graph
corresponding to the 3-SAT problem (a1 ∨ a2 ∨ a3) ∧ (¬a1 ∨
a2∨¬a3). It can be easily seen that the order of the delegation-
revocation graph is linear in the size of the 3-SAT problem
(more precisely, if n denotes the number of clauses of the 3-
SAT problem, the order of the delegation-revocation graph is
always less than or equal to 10n+ 2).
The delegation-revocation graph has the following princi-
pals:
• SOA
• ai and ¬ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• lij for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
• SATi for 0 ≤ i ≤ m
The graph has the following positive edges:
• From SOA to a1 and to ¬a1
• From ai to ai+1 and ¬ai+1, for 1 ≤ i < n
• From ¬ai to ai+1 and ¬ai+1, for 1 ≤ i < n
• From an and ¬an to SAT0.
• From SATi to li+1j for 0 ≤ i < m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
• From lij to SATi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
The graph has the following negative edges:
• From ak to any lij that is of the form ¬ak
• From ¬ak to any lij that is of the form ak
Example 3: The delegation-revocation graph corresponding
to the 3-SAT problem (a1 ∨ a2 ∨ a3) ∧ (¬a1 ∨ a2 ∨ ¬a3)
SOA
a1 ¬a1
a2 ¬a2
a3 ¬a3
SAT0
l11 l
1
2 l
1
3
SAT1
l21 l
2
2 l
2
3
SAT2
The following lemma establishes the desired result that
determining safe access right for principal SATm in the
constructed delegation-revocation graph amounts to solving
the 3-SAT problem for C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm:
Lemma 1: SATm has safe access right iff C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm is
satisfiable.
Proof: First note that every path from SOA to SAT0
corresponds to an assignment of truth values to a1, . . . , an:
For each a ≤ i ≤ n, each such path goes through precisely
one of ai and ¬ai, and we assign ai the truth value True in the
corresponding truth value assignment iff the path goes through
ai.
Every path from SOA to SATm consists of a path from
SOA to SAT0 followed by a path from SAT0 to SATm. The
subpath from SAT0 to SATm goes through precisely one of
li1, l
i
2 and l
i
3 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The path from SOA to SATm
can only be a good delegation chain if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
the literal lij through which the path goes is assigned the truth
7value T under the truth value assignment corresponding to the
subpath from SOA to SAT0.
So SATm has safe access right
• iff there is a good delegation chain from SOA to SATm
• iff there is a path from SOA to SAT0 and a path from
SAT0 to SATm such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
the literal lij through which the from SAT0 to SATm
goes is assigned the truth value T under the truth value
assignment corresponding to the subpath from SOA to
SAT0
• iff there is an assignment of truth values to a1, . . . , an
and a choice of lij ∈ {li1, li2, li3} for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m
such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, lij is true under this truth
value assignment
• iff C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn is satisfiable.
Hence we have established the following theorem:
Theorem 1: The decision problem of determining whether
a principal p in a delegation-revocation graph has safe ac-
cess right is NP-complete with respect to the order of the
delegation-revocation graph.
V. BOUNDED DELEGATION DEPTH
Given that deciding safe access right in an access-control
framework with no limitations on delegations is NP-complete,
it is of interest to study sensible limitations that can be
imposed on an access-control framework in order to reduce the
complexity of this decision problem to polynomial time. In this
section we consider the possibility of limiting the maximum
delegation depth, i.e. the maximum length of delegation chain,
by a constant integer.
Multiple access control frameworks allow for limiting the
delegation depth [16], [12]. However, in these frameworks the
maximum delegation chain can be freely chosen by the source
of authority, and there is no upper bound for the integers that
the source of authority may choose for this purpose.
The limitation that we consider in this section is different
in nature: We suppose that a fixed integer m is defined
in the access control policy to be the universal maximum
delegation depth, and no source of authority can allow for
deeper delegation of the rights that he or she delegate to
others. We call this fixed integer m the bound on delegation
depth. The following theorem establishes that if there is such
a bound on delegation depth, then the complexity of deciding
safe access right is polynomial in the number of principals:
Theorem 2: Let m be the bound on the length of delegation
chains. Then the runtime complexity of deciding whether a
principal has safe access right is at most O(nm), where n
denotes the number of principals.
Proof: Assuming that the length of delegation chains may
not be more than m, Algorithm 1 decides whether a principal
p has safe access right. It does this by checking for every
sequence of principals of length at most m whether it is a
good delegation chain from SOA to p: After selecting such
a sequence σ, the value of the Boolean b′ is set to True
(line 3). If some reason is found for concluding that σ is not
a good delegation chain from SOA to p, the value of b′ is
Algorithm 1 Determining safe access with bounded dele-
gation chain length
Input: delegation-revocation graph G = (V,SOA, E+, E−),
principal p ∈ V
Output: a Boolean b stating whether p is granted safe access
right or not
1: b← False
2: for σ a sequence of principals in G with length(σ) ≤ m
do
3: b′ ← True
4: if σ[0] 6= SOA or σ[length(σ)− 1] 6= p then
5: b′ ← False
6: else
7: for i ∈ {0, . . . , length(σ)− 2} do
8: if (σ[i], σ[i+ 1]) /∈ E+ then
9: b′ ← False, break
10: if b′ = True then
11: for j ∈ {i, . . . , length(σ)− 1} do
12: if (σ[i], σ[j]) ∈ E− then
13: b′ ← False, break
14: if b′ = False then
15: break
16: if b′ = True then
17: b← True, break
changed to False (lines 4-13): This can happen either because
the sequence does not start at SOA or does not end at p (lines
4-5), because some principal in the sequence has not granted
a positive authorization to the next principal in the sequence
(lines 8-9), or because there is a negative authorization from
one principal to a later principal in the sequence (11-13). The
breaks in lines 9, 13 and 15 ensure that once it has been
established that a sequence is not a good delegation chain,
the algorithm immediately stops considering this sequence. As
soon as a good delegation chain has been found, access right
is granted and the algorithm stops (lines 16-17).
Now we show that the algorithm’s runtime is at most k ·
nm for some constant k. First note that there are less than
m · nm sequences of principals of length at most m. Hence
it is enough to show that the time needed for the execution
of lines 3-17 (checking whether a given sequence is a good
delegation chain) has a constant upper bound. This follows
from the fact that both in the for-loop starting in line 7 and
in the for-loop starting in line 11, the number of iterations is
bounded by the constant m.
VI. DELEGATION REVOCATION IN A HIERARCHICAL
SETTING
In this section we consider another limitation that can be
imposed onto the access-control framework in order to avoid
the NP-completeness of deciding safe access right. Roughly
speaking, the limitation is that principals form a hierarchy that
graph-theoretically forms a rooted tree, and that all delegation
and revocation has to respect this hierarchy. After making
this limitation more precise, we show that it reduces the
complexity of deciding safe access right for principal p to
8runtime quadratic in the hierarchical depth of of principal p
(this depth is at most the number of principals in the system,
but usually much less).
Let us first motivate the limitation that we impose in this
section: Suppose that a company wants to use an access-
control framework that allows for delegation. Suppose for sim-
plicity that every principal in the company’s computer system
is a human user. Furthermore, suppose that the employees
of the company form a hierarchy in which everyone apart
from the company’s CEO has precisely one direct boss. So
the employees of the company form a hierarchy like the one
depicted in example 4 that has the graph-theoretical structure
of a rooted tree. In other words, when depicting the employees
as vertices and the relation between an employee and her direct
subordinate by a directed edge, the result is a directed graph
with a distinguished vertex, the root, corresponding to the
company’s CEO, such that there is precisely one path from
the root to any other vertex in the graph.
Example 4: Example of a hierarchy with the graph-
theoretical structure of a rooted tree with root A
A
B C D
E F G
H I J
In example 4, A is the direct boss of B, C and D; C is the
direct boss of E, F and G; E is the direct boss of H and I; and
G is the direct boss of J.
In practice, there will also be principals that do not corre-
spond to employees of the company but to processes in the
company’s computer network. Nevertheless, it might still be
possible to impose such a tree-like hierarchical structure onto
the principals.
The idea now is to limit delegation, i.e. the issuing of
positive authorizations, and revocation, i.e. the issuing of
negative authorizations, in the following way: A principal i
may only issue a positive authorization to principal j if i is
directly above j in the hierarchy. For negative authorizations
the restriction is less strict: A principal i may only issue
a negative authorization to principal j if i is (directly or
indirectly) above j in the hierarchy , i.e. if there is a path
from i to j in the directed graph that represents the hierarchy.
Thus in example 4, A can issue positive authorizations to B,
C and D, and negative authorizations to everyone, whereas,
for example, C can issue positive authorizations to E, F and
G, and negative authorizations to E, F, G, H, I and J.
The distinction between the more strict limitation on pos-
itive authorizations and the less strict limitation on negative
authorizations can be motivated as follows: In order to get
some permission, one’s direct boss should consent. But for
taking away a permission there should be more flexibility,
because for avoiding security threats it is important to react
quickly when a principal is identified as not trustworthy: If
only the direct boss could take away someone’s permission,
this would cause additional delay, for example if the direct
boss of the problematic principal is currently not available.
By allowing the boss’s boss, the boss’s boss’s boss etc. to
also take away a principal’s permission, a quick reaction to
the identification of a principal as harmful is more likely.
We are not making any assumptions about whether the
tree-like hierarchical structure is constant or can be modified
over time. We don’t even have to assume that the same
hierarchical structure is used for all rights: There could in
principle be different hierarchical structures corresponding to
different delegatable rights.
When we focus on the authorizations issued for one par-
ticular access right, the only part of the hierarchy tree that is
relevant is the subtree of the hierarchy tree that consists of
the source of authority for that access right and all principals
(directly or indirectly) below this source of authority. This
subtree is again a rooted tree, now with the source of authority
at its root. The rest of the hierarchical tree is not relevant for
determining this access right and will be ignored for the rest
of the discussion in this section. So any reference to a rooted
tree from now onwards will concern this subtree of the original
hierarchical tree.
The following notion of a hierarchical delegation-
revocation graph formalizes the situation in which we have to
determine access given the hierarchical limitation on issuing
authorizations discussed above:
Definition 7: A hierarchical delegation-revocation graph
is a graph G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−) consisting of a set
V of vertices, also called principals, a distinguished vertex
SOA ∈ V called the source of authority, a set H ⊆ V 2 of
hierarchy edges, a set E+ ⊆ V 2 of positive edges, also called
positive authorizations, and a set E− ⊆ V 2 of negative edges,
also called negative authorizations, satisfying the following
properties:
1) For every principal p ∈ G there is precisely one path of
hierarchy edges connecting SOA to p.
2) E+ ⊆ H .
3) Whenever (p1, p2) ∈ E−, there is a path of hierarchy
edges from p1 to p2.
This definition extends definition 1 of a delegation-
revocation graph from subsection III-A by adding a set H
of hierarchy edges. Property 1 ensures that the principals and
hierarchy edges form a rooted tree with the SOA as root.
Properties 2 and 3 ensure that authorizations have only been
issued in accordance with the limitation defined above: By
property 2, a positive authorization from p1 to p2 can only
have been issued if p1 is directly above p2 in the hierarchy,
i.e. if (p1, p2) ∈ H . By property 3, a negative authorization
from p1 to p2 can only have been issued if p1 is (directly or
indirectly) above p2 in the hierarchy, i.e. if there is a path of
hierarchy edges from p1 to p2.
The definitions for good delegation chains and safe access
in hierarchical delegation-revocation graphs are the same as
the corresponding definitions for non-hierarchical delegation-
revocation graphs in subsection III-E above:
Definition 8: Let G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−) be a hierarchi-
cal delegation- revocation graph. A good delegation chain in
9G is a sequence of vertices v0, . . . , vn such that v0 = SOA,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E+ for 0 ≤ i < n, and (vi, vj) /∈ E− for any
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Definition 9: Let G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−) be a hier-
archical delegation- revocation graph, and let p ∈ V be a
principal. We say that p has safe access right iff there is a
good delegation chain in G that ends in p.
In order to state the theorem about the complexity of
determining safe access right, we need the notion of the
hierarchical depth of a principal:
Definition 10: Let G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−) be a hier-
archical delegation- revocation graph, and let p ∈ V be a
principal. The hierarchical depth of p in G is the length of
the unique path of hierarchy edges from SOA to p.
The following theorem establishes that the runtime com-
plexity of determining safe access right of a principal p is
quadratic in the hierarchical depth of principal p:
Theorem 3: Let G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−) be a hierarchical
delegation-revocation graph, and let p ∈ V be a principal. Let
n denote the hierarchical depth of p in G. Then the runtime
complexity of deciding whether a principal has safe access
right is at most O(n2).
Proof: Algorithm 2 decides whether principal p has safe
access right. It does this by looking at the unique path
[p1, . . . , pn] from SOA to p (so p1 = SOA and pn = p) and
determining whether it is a good delegation chain (there cannot
be any other good delegation chain by the restrictions imposed
on hierarchical delegation-revocation graphs). For this, two
properties have to be satisfied:
• Positive authorizations have to be in place along the
whole path [p1, . . . , pn], i.e. (pi, pi+1) ∈ E+ for 1 ≤
i ≤ n: This is checked in lines 3-5 of Algorithm 2. Note
that the algorithm actually checks whether this property
fails for some i, setting the Boolean b to False and halting
if it fails for some i.
• No negative authorizations may be in place from an
earlier to a later principal in the path [p1, . . . , pn], i.e.
for no 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, (pi, pj) ∈ E−: This is checked
in lines 7-10 of Algorithm 2. The algorithm searches for
such a negative authorization (pi, pj), and if one is found,
b is set to True and the algorithm halts.
Algorithm 2 clearly has runtime at most quadratic in the
hierarchical depth n of p: Finding the unique path from SOA
to p (line 2) is actually linear in n. So is the procedure in
lines 3-5. The time needed for executing lines 7-10 is at most
O(n2) given that both the for-loop starting in line 7 and the
for-loop starting in line 8 have at most n iterations.
VII. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO MITIGATING THE
PROBLEM
The limitations discussed in sections V and VI can be used
to significantly reduce the computational cost of determining
safe access right. However, depending on the institutional and
technical setting in which the access control framework is to
be used, these limitations may or may not be desirable. If they
are not desirable, other approaches to mitigating the problem
need to be adopted. In this section we therefore consider a
Algorithm 2 Determining safe access in a hierarchical
delegation-revocation graph
Input: hierarchical delegation-revocation graph
G = (V,SOA, H,E+, E−), principal p ∈ V
Output: a Boolean b stating whether p is granted safe access
right or not
1: b← True
2: [p1, . . . , pn]← the unique path from SOA to p
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
4: if (pi, pi+1) /∈ E+ then
5: b← False, break
6: if b = True then
7: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
8: for i ≤ j ≤ n do
9: if (pi, pj) ∈ E− then
10: b← False, break
further approach to mitigate the problem of the computational
cost of deciding safe access right, which does not remove NP-
completeness completely, but ensures that it can only rarely
cause significant delays.
This approach is motivated by the idea that there should
normally be objective reasons for issuing a negative autho-
rization. If Alice issues a negative authorization towards Bob,
this means that Alice distrusts Bob to use the access right
in question. Alice should of course have some reason for
this distrust. If this reason is objective rather than subjective,
then Alice should be able to convince the source of authority
of the distrustworthiness of Bob. But if the SOA can be
made to distrust Bob, then the SOA herself should issue
a negative authorization towards Bob. And when there is a
negative authorization from the SOA to Bob, Bob can under
no circumstances get access right, so the negative authorization
from Alice to Bob is no longer required.
In other words, a negative authorization from i to j should
under normal circumstances be replaced by a negative autho-
rization from the SOA to j.
At this point an attentive reader may ask why principals
other than the SOA should be allowed to issue negative
authorizations in the first place. The reason is very simple:
Once Alice finds out something about Bob that suggests Bob
is to be distrusted, it is important for Alice to ensure quickly
that Bob does not use his access right obtained through Alice
for malicious action. If only the SOA could issue negative
authorizations, Alice would first have to convince the SOA
of the distrustworthiness of Bob, which would give Bob
additional time for performing something malicious.
This suggests that the following approach to negative au-
thorization may be taken in practice: Principals other than the
SOA can issue negative authorizations in order to ensure quick
action upon the discovery of a distrustworthy principal. When
issuing a negative authorization, a principal should report to
the SOA the reasons for issuing this negative authorization.
The SOA then decides whether the negative authorization is
justified or not. If yes, the SOA herself issues a negative
authorization towards the distrusted principal; this makes the
original negative authorization obsolete, so that it can be
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removed. If not, the original authorization should also be re-
moved. This means that under normal circumstances, negative
authorizations issued by principals other than the SOA only
exist for short moments of time, and most of the time the only
negative authorizations in place are issued by the SOA.
This motivates the following definitions: We say that the
delegation-revocation graph is in a stable state when all
negative authorizations in place are issued by the SOA; else
we say it is in an unstable state.
A further idea behind our approach is that access requests
should in general be treated quickly, so it is not desirable
to have the whole computational burden of finding good
delegation chains being performed at runtime in response to
an access request. Instead, this computational burden can be
partly tackled offline independently of specific access requests.
The method described for the rest of this section keeps
track of access rights and of some good delegation chains
witnessing these access rights offline, updating the information
whenever a new authorization is added. In the ideal case, the
access right information is already updated at the moment an
access request is received by the reference monitor, so that
access can be granted or denied quickly. The method works
efficiently at stable states, so that access requests occurring
while the delegation-revocation graph is in a stable state can
always be treated quickly. At an unstable state, the method
may face a computationally expensive subroutine, which can
lead the system to be unsure as to the access right status of
some principals. If an access request from such a principal
arrives at such a moment, significant delays may occur.
First we describe how the method works when the
delegation-revocation graph constantly stays in a stable state.
For every stable state the delegation-revocation graph is in,
the method determines a set Access of principals that currently
have access right, and a function WitnessingChain that assigns
one good delegation chain to each principal in Access in such a
way that for every p ∈ Access, the chain WitnessingChain(p)
witnesses the access right of principal p. At the beginning,
there are no authorizations and only the SOA has access right,
so the initial value of Access is {SOA}, and the function
WitnessingChain is initially defined only at on the domain
{SOA} by setting the value of WitnessingChain(SOA) to the
empty chain.
When a positive authorization from i to j is added to the
delegation-revocation graph, the method checks whether i and
j are in Access. If i ∈ Access but j /∈ Access, the sets Access
and WitnessingChain are updated as follows:
• Access is set to Access ∪ {j}.
• WitnessingChain(j) is set to be WitnessingChain(i) +
j, i.e. the chain resulting from extending the chain
WitnessingChain(i) by principal j.
If a negative authorization from SOA to j is added to
the delegation-revocation graph, the method calls Algorithm
3 as a subroutine. Algorithm 3 updates the set Access and
the function WitnessingChain by first determining (in lines
1-4) which chains in the co-domain of WitnessingChain are
no longer good delegation chains because of the new negative
authorization, and then (in lines 6-11) trying to find alternative
good delegation chains that may substitute the invalidated
Algorithm 3 Updating the set Access and the function
WitnessingChain when the SOA issues a negative autho-
rization towards j
Input: delegation-revocation graph G = (V,SOA, E+, E−),
principal j ∈ V , Access, WitnessingChain
Output: updated values for Access and WitnessingChain
1: GoodChainMissing ← {}
2: for C in the co-domain of WitnessingChain do
3: if principal j occurs in the chain C then
4: GoodChainMissing ← GoodChainMissing ∪
{the last element of C}
5: Access ← Access \ GoodChainMissing
6: for 1 ≤ i ≤ |GoodChainMissing| do
7: for p ∈ Access do
8: for p′ ∈ GoodChainMIssing do
9: if (p, p′) ∈ E+ and (SOA, p′) /∈ E− then
10: Access ← Access ∪ {p′}
11: WitnessingChain(p′) ← WitnessingChain(p) +
p′
delegation chains. GoodChainMissing is the set of principals
p for which good delegation chains are missing after the
new negative authorization from SOA to j invalidated the
delegation chain witnessing the access right of p. After access
has been temporarily removed in line 5 from every principal
whose delegation chain has been invalidated, the method
defined in lines 6-11 for finding alternative good delegation
chains for these principals works by iteratively giving back
access right to all principals that have received a positive
authorization from someone with access right and that have not
received a negative authorization from the SOA. After iterating
this procedure |GoodChainMissing| times (i.e. as often as
the number of principals that may need to be given back
their access right), every principal with safe access right is
guaranteed to be in Access.
It can easily be seen that the runtime of Algorithm 3 is in
the worst case cubic in the number of principals (because of
the three nested for-loops in lines 6-11).
In the case of these modifications that leave the delegation-
revocation graph in a stable state, the computations required
for updating Access and WitnessingChain are reasonably fast,
so that we can assume that these updates are always computed
before any access request made after the modification to the
graph is handled.
But when the delegation-revocation graph becomes unstable
because of the addition of a negative authorization from i
to j for i 6= SOA, the procedure of updating Access and
WitnessingChain is NP-complete. We refrain from specifying a
particular procedure for updating Access and WitnessingChain
in this case; this update should be done using some method
oriented at solving NP-hard problems, like a state-of-the-art
SAT-solver [8]. Note that this update procedure may take
a considerable amount of time and an access request may
be made during this time. In this case, priority should be
given to determining the access right of the requester before
determining the access right of other principals. Of course,
determining the access right of the requester is also NP-
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complete, so if the delegation-revocation graph is big and
complex and the SAT-solver happens not to find a good
delegation graph in a reasonable amount of time, the requester
may have to wait until the delegation-revocation graph returns
to a stable state before getting a response to his access request.
When the delegation-revocation graph returns to a stable
state from an unstable state, the values of the set Access and
the function WitnessingChain are determined based on their
values at the last stable state and the changes that have been
made to the delegation-revocation graph with respect to this
last stable state.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In an access-control framework with the possibility to
delegate permissions, it is desirable to have a possibility
to revoke delegated permissions. In the literature, multiple
revocation schemes have been studied and compared. One
class of revocation schemes are negative revocation schemes,
i.e. revocation schemes that function by issuing a negative
authorization. In section III, we have compared three different
ways that have been proposed to define the effect of negative
authorizations. In subsection III-D, we have pointed out that
two of these three definitions pose a security threat by not
properly defining the effect of multiple interacting negative
authorizations. However, the definition from Cramer et al. [6]
that avoids this threat comes at a price: It makes determining
access right an NP-complete problem, as we have shown in
section IV.
Given that the other two definitions of the effect of negative
authorizations pose a security threat, it is certainly not a
good idea to avoid this complexity problem by using these
definitions instead of the safe definition by Cramer et al. [6].
Instead, we have considered three possible ways of solving or
handling this complexity problem:
• In section V we established that bounding delegation
depth to an integer m reduces runtime complexity to a
polynomial of degree m.
• In section VI we have shown that a limitation in delega-
tion and revocation based on a hierarchical structure of
the principals makes the runtime complexity of determin-
ing access for a principal p quadratic in the hierarchical
depth of p.
• In section VII we have discussed an approach to mitigate
the problem of computational cost in praxis, based on
the idea that negative authorizations issued by principals
other than the source of authority should only be con-
sidered temporary measures. We have defined a method
that keeps track of who has access right offline, i.e.
independently of access requests. The updates defined
in this method take time at most cubic in the number
of principals when the negative authorizations in place
are all issued by the source of authority, but significant
delays may occur when other principals issue negative
authorizations that are not quickly replaced by negative
authorizations issued by the source of authority.
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